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Abstract
Informal payments for healthcare are widely acknowledged as undercutting health care access,
but empirical research is somewhat limited. This article is a critical interpretive synthesis that summa-
rizes the evidence base on the drivers and impact of informal payments in maternal health care and
critically interrogates the paradigms that are used to describe informal payments. Studies
and conceptual articles identified both proximate and systems drivers of informal payments. These in-
clude norms of gift giving, health workforce scarcity, inadequate health systems financing, the extent
of formal user fees, structural adjustment and the marketization of health care, and patient willingness
to pay for better care. Similarly, there are proximal and distal impacts, including on household finances,
patient satisfaction and provider morale. Informal payments have been studied and addressed from a
variety of different perspectives, including anti-corruption, ethnographic and other in-depth qualitative
approaches and econometric modelling. Summarizing and discussing the advantages and disadvan-
tages of these and other paradigms illustrates the value of an inter-disciplinary approach. The same
tacit, hidden attributes that make informal payments hard to measure also make them hard to discuss
and address. A multidisciplinary health systems approach that leverages and integrates positivist, inter-
pretivist and constructivist tools of social science research can lead to better insight. With this, we can
challenge ‘master narratives’ and meet universalistic, equity-oriented global health objectives.
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Introduction
At their most vulnerable moments, labouring women may be con-
fronted with coercive, financially taxing demands for informal pay-
ments in order to receive the health care to which they are entitled
(Afsana, 2004; Riewpaiboon et al., 2005; Tibandebage and
Mackintosh, 2005; Lewis, 2007; Kruk et al., 2008; Mæstad and
Mwisongo, 2011; Vian et al., 2012; 2015; Pieterse and Lodge,
Key Messages
• Informal payments can best be understood by taking a multidisciplinary approach.
• Extant research indicates that informal payments are caused by multiple contextual factors.
• Factors include resources, governance, norms, knowledge and beliefs.
• Informal payments can impact patient welfare, quality and health system functioning.
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2015). Following Gaal et al.’s (2006a) definition, we use the term
‘informal payments’ to describe a cash or in-kind payment made to
health care providers for a service to which the patient is entitled
and which is additional to any officially sanctioned contribution
required. This includes payment for care or for material entitle-
ments, such as medicines. Informal payments are a subset of the
broader category of ‘out of pocket payments’, which, in addition to
informal payments, includes formal user fees and any other costs
incurred while seeking and obtaining health care, such as transport.
Despite significant financial and political investment in maternal
health in the Millennium Development Goal era, informal payments
continue to undercut ambitious plans to enhance access, utilization
and quality of prenatal and delivery care. Moreover, demands for
payments are often experienced by poor women as yet another mo-
ment when governmental employees prey on them, rather than pro-
viding succour and reaffirming the entitlements of citizenship
(Diarra, 2012; Coffey, 2014; Dasgupta et al., 2015). At the same
time, the frontline health workers demanding these payments may
be struggling to fulfil their professional mandate in a health system
characterized by inadequate infrastructure and inputs, little or even
punitive supervision, and poor morale and trust (Tibandebage and
Mackintosh, 2005; Aberese-Ako et al., 2014; Hahonou, 2015).
Quantitative and qualitative peer-reviewed and grey literature
studies focused on informal payments or related health systems
issues have found informal payments to be prevalent in health care
(including but also beyond maternal care) in many low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs) in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the
former Soviet Union (fSU; Lewis, 2007; Gao et al., 2010; Mæstad
and Mwisongo, 2011; Paredes-Solı´s et al., 2011; Brody et al., 2013;
Arnold et al., 2014; Coffey, 2014; Abdallah et al., 2015; Vian et al.,
2015; Bertone and Lagarde, 2016; Kankeu and Ventelou, 2016;
Habibov and Cheung, 2017). Reported prevalence rates vary signifi-
cantly; the studies cited above, e.g. vary from 20% to 70%.
Researchers and programme evaluators often identify informal
payments as health system factors that make women less likely to
deliver in a health facility (Dasgupta et al., 2015). Civil society
groups and activists routinely decry their impact, and, in some coun-
tries, informal payments are regularly discussed in the print media
(Gopakumar, 1998; Thampi, 2002; Chandra, 2010; Karmakar,
2015; Wojczewski et al., 2015; Mudur, 2016). Yet, given their pri-
macy in the patient experience, some aspects of informal payments
are comparatively under-addressed in research, policy and pro-
grammes. Research gaps include those relating to the experience of
informal payments in certain regions, notably sub-Saharan Africa;
as well as thematic and conceptual gaps such as how patients experi-
ence informal payments, and how informal payments can
be understood within the complex ecology of health service facility-
level dynamics (Kankeu and Ventelou, 2016). In brief, the ‘on the
ground’ salience of informal payments to understanding both access
to, and quality of, maternal health care is not matched by top-down
attention and action.
This article is a critical interpretive synthesis (CIS) that summa-
rizes the evidence base on the drivers, and impact of informal pay-
ments, and critically interrogates the paradigms that are used to
describe informal payments. The intent is to provide a comprehen-
sive synthesis of ‘what we know’ about informal payments; and then
to step back, assess the theoretical bases of ‘what we know’ and
make propositions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of how
the phenomenon has been researched and understood. This research
offers researchers, policymakers and donors a broad picture of re-
search and theory, helping them to situate the more parsimonious
studies of prevalence and drivers, and to identity and critically
engage the assumptions in research and policy articles. Our key con-
cern is maternal health. However, given the fact that there is rela-
tively little research on informal payments within maternal health
care specifically and that most frontline providers and communities
draw conclusions about the health system based on their interac-
tions with all types of health providers—not just maternal health
providers—we often speak about informal payments and access to
health care more broadly.
CIS facilitates broad-based, multidisciplinary exploration of
topics of interest. In contrast to systematic reviews, CIS is inductive
and iterative (Dixon-Woods et al., 2005; Heaton et al., 2012;
Wilson et al., 2014), and it facilitates exploration of a heterogeneous
body of literature (Moat et al., 2013). Beyond aggregating and/or
synthesizing data, CIS also enables identification of new analytic
constructs, synthesizing arguments, and questions (Flemming, 2010;
Moat et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 2014; Ako-Arrey et al., 2016). It
has successfully been used to explicate health systems questions in
high-income countries (Dixon-Woods et al., 2006; Flemming, 2010;
Entwistle et al., 2012), and on a limited basis, in reference to health
systems in LMICs (McFerran et al., 2017).
Given the current state of knowledge on informal payments, CIS
is particularly apt. As a cross-cutting health systems and governance
concern, informal payments have been described and addressed
from a variety of different fields and paradigms. Respecting a ‘prin-
ciple of pluralism’ reveals how different approaches can illuminate
the problem as a whole (Greenhalgh et al., 2005). Synthesizing dis-
cussions across these approaches and putting them in dialogue with
one another in light of the empirical evidence highlights the contri-
butions of each approach. There are several non-systematic, reviews
of informal payments that focus on particular geographic regions or
that appear in the grey literature; as well as published reviews of
related issues, such as how to define informal payments, and the
abolition of formal user fees (Gaal et al., 2006a,b; Lewis, 2007;
Vian, 2008; Cohen, 2012). There are two related systematic
reviews—one on methods for assessing the burden of informal pay-
ments (Khodamoradi et al., 2018), and one on defining informal
payments in health care (Chereches¸ et al., 2013). Building on these
studies, CIS facilitates exploration of the terminological and concep-
tual confusion that characterizes discussion of informal payments,
and of the research on broader health systems concerns that are ger-
mane to informal payments, but that do not take informal payments
as their central focus (Gaal et al., 2006a). In other words, we seek to
go beyond the aggregation of insights that are contained in articles
focused on informal payments, and to synthesize insights included in
articles that explore informal payments as part of a broader health
systems analysis. In brief, rather than understanding informal pay-
ments as a dependent variable, i.e. shaped by independent variables,
we looked at how these payments are rooted in an overall cultural,
social, political and economic system, and how this system iterative-
ly interacts with informal payments.
Methods
The CIS is grounded in a health policy and systems research frame-
work, and adopts the premise that health systems are core social insti-
tutions. A health system perspective entails exploring how practices
at the frontlines are embedded within the larger system, including
across levels of the health system and across health concerns (Gilson
and Daire, 2011). As such, our search explicitly sought out insights
from more positivist approaches to describing and prescribing, such
as classical microeconomics and epidemiology, as well as significant
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research using interpretivist and constructivist approaches from the
social sciences. The latter are particularly helpful for understanding
‘how health system actors understand and experience particular serv-
ices or policies and what social and political processes, including
power relations, influence them’ (Gilson et al., 2011).
This CIS was completed in a multistage process. The initial ques-
tions that guided our practice were:
• What empirical evidence do we have regarding the drivers and
impacts of informal payments for (maternal) health in LMICs?
• What paradigms and approaches are used to assess and address
informal payments, and what are the advantages and disadvan-
tages of these?
Consistent with the CIS approach, these questions served as a
compass, rather than an anchor, for the research; we followed rele-
vant strands in the literature as they emerged, rather than establish-
ing a priori areas of interest (Eakin and Mykhalovskiy, 2003;
Dixon-Woods et al., 2005; Ako-Arrey et al., 2016). The steps we
took included the following.
Our article selection process is illustrated in Figure 1. The first
phase employed diversity sampling; we sought to get an overall view
of the empirical research, social science theory and programme types
focused on informal payments. Consistent with our cross-
disciplinary interest and as per methodology for CIS, the criteria for
article inclusion related to relevance and the likelihood that the art-
icle would contribute to theory development, not to study design or
to a prima facie set of quality indicators, which would be difficult to
apply to a heterogeneous collection of literature (Wilson et al.,
2014; Ako-Arrey et al., 2016). We began with relevant articles we
knew about, and searched ScienceDirect, PubMed, GoogleScholar
and Google, using the terms ‘informal payments AND health’,
‘bribes AND health’, ‘out of pocket payments AND health’ and ‘cor-
ruption AND health’. We did not establish any limitations regarding
when the article was published. All empirical studies from LMICs as
well as from countries of Eastern Europe (EE) and the fSU were
included for initial review. EE and fSU countries were included be-
cause several of them are middle income, and because there has been
a significant amount of scholarship on informal payments in these
countries. Finally, a few articles containing significant theoretical or
conceptual discussion but with data from high-income countries
were included. Of the 260 articles identified for initial review, we
selected 59 for inclusion in our synthesis; we chose these 59 after
reading the abstract and deciding whether or not they were indeed
focused on informal payments and would thus aid theory develop-
ment. We excluded, e.g. articles that were about out-of-pocket pay-
ments in general, but that did not acknowledge informal payments.
We then read these 59 articles and identified new areas of re-
search that we felt would further illuminate the proximate and distal
drivers and impacts of informal payments (Dixon-Woods et al.,
2006). We searched these terms in GoogleScholar and
ScienceDirect. The new areas of research were patient satisfaction,
disrespect and abuse, formal user fees, trust, and health service util-
ization. The specific search terms applied included: ‘patient satisfac-
tion’, ‘disrespect AND abuse AND health’, ‘user fees AND health’,
‘trust AND health’, ‘health AND utilization’ and ‘health AND ac-
ceptability’. The objective of following these lines of enquiry was to
place informal payments in a larger conceptual and policy context,
rather than to review exhaustively the literature in each of these
areas (Moat et al., 2013). Based on the abstract, the most relevant
articles (usually 2–4) were chosen for each set of search terms.
We determined relevance based on how much the article addressed
informal payments. For example, did the article just mention the
broad category of out-of-pocket payments as a driver of low pa-
tient satisfaction, or did it discuss informal payments specifically,
and how patients experience or interpret these? None of these
articles focused exclusively on informal payments, but they helped
us to better understand the context of informal payments. A total
of 19 articles for our synthesis were identified and added in
this phase.
These 78 articles were then entered into an extraction tool that
included fields for methods, drivers, impacts and key conceptual
points, such as the author’s perspective on whether or not informal
payments constituted corruption. There were no pre-set categories
for the key conceptual points; we identified them inductively. We
also synthesized data as we entered it into tool, and in so doing,
started to draw conclusions. For example, our analysis of the extent
to which institutionalization of formal user fees increased or
decreased informal payments was entered into the ‘drivers’ field, ir-
respective of whether the study authors were examining formal fees
as a driver per se. The drivers, impacts and key conceptual points
then informed the structure of the article. The citation list of all but
the most tangential articles was assessed for additional relevant
articles that may have been missed (snowballing). This phase helped
us to deepen our understanding of the contextual health systems
issues, as we sought out theoretical and conceptual work underpin-
ning some of the tensions that had emerged in our analysis, such as
whether or not informal payments should be considered corruption
and how they relate to structural adjustment. A further 27 articles
were identified in this way and then also entered into the extraction
tool and analysed in the same way as the initial set of 78 articles,
bringing the total number to 95 articles. If these articles reinforced
or contradicted conceptual points we identified earlier, we recorded
this in the tool. If they raised new points, we added these as well.
We also developed memos on topics that emerged and could not be
adequately entered into the tool; some of these memos were used in
early drafts of the article.
As the writing process was near completion, we did a final search
(using our initial search terms) on GoogleScholar, PubMed and
ScienceDirect for any new articles related to informal payments for
health care in LMICs that may have appeared since our initial
search. Ten new articles were identified in this way, and the findings
Fig. 1: Article selection process.
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were integrated into our extant draft. We integrated the articles by
citing them if they confirmed or undercut existing points, or expand-
ing arguments where they offered new insights. All told, our synthe-
sis was informed by 115 articles, of which 100 are from the peer-
reviewed literature and 15 of which are grey literature publications.
The first author conducted the substantive review and summa-
ries, and discussed findings and interpretation with the second
author.
Results and discussion
Types of informal payments
As per our definition of informal payments, we only considered a
payment to be informal if it was for a service, i.e. part of the stand-
ard entitlement. In some countries, entitlements may include food
and laundry in the health facility, support for transportation to and
from the facility, and other such ancillary services. In the case of la-
bour and delivery care specifically, patients report being asked to
pay for drugs and other medical supplies; non-medical supplies;
blood; laboratory tests; birth registration and other needed docu-
ments; to receive a facility delivery-related conditional cash transfer
to which they were entitled; to see and hold their newborns; and for
doctors, nurses and other providers and health facility staff to pro-
vide medical care (Killingsworth et al., 1999; Afsana, 2004;
Tibandebage and Mackintosh, 2005; Lewis, 2007; Chuma et al.,
2009; Human Rights Watch, 2009; Stringhini et al., 2009; Hunt,
2010; Stepurko et al., 2013; Tumlinson et al., 2013; Arnold et al.,
2014; Dasgupta et al., 2015).
Moreover, through our readings, we identified significant reli-
ability and validity challenges to the measures researchers use. First,
many studies relied on patient self-report. Yet, several studies
showed that patients were often unable to distinguish between offi-
cial user fees and informal payments, so self-reported survey infor-
mation may not accurately capture informal fee prevalence as
distinct from formal user fees (Killingsworth et al., 1999;
Falkingham, 2004; Mamdani and Bangser, 2004; Gaal et al., 2006b;
Lewis, 2006; 2007; Chereches¸ et al., 2013). Often, patients pay a
combination of both (Killingsworth et al., 1999; Afsana, 2004;
Perkins et al., 2009). They may also be deliberately misled about
what they are paying for, such as being told that they are paying for
necessary drugs when they are not (Sharma et al., 2005). Second, the
distinction between gift giving and informal payments can be blurry.
In surveys, patients report giving both, with the most widely
accepted distinction being whether the money was provided prior to
or after care was received, with money given before care being
understood as a payment and money given after care understood as
a gift (Balabanova and McKee, 2002; Tatar et al., 2007; Chereches¸
et al., 2013). However, there are reports of very forceful demands
for informal payments being made after the provision of care, so this
distinction between voluntary and involuntary and when the service
is provided does not always hold (Afsana, 2004). Moreover, some
report giving ‘gift assurance’ to improve the quality of care pro-
vided, suggesting that the gift is understood to be necessary in order
to receive appropriate care (Ayanore et al., 2018).
Our review identified other measurement challenges related to
prevalence in addition to inability to distinguish between informal
payments and other types of financial outlays. Respondents—both
patients and providers—may be reluctant to report engaging in prac-
tices that are not openly discussed and that may be associated with
corruption (Vian, 2008; Lindkvist, 2013; Abdallah et al., 2015).
Also, informal payments may be so normalized that respondents do
not mention them when they are asked about payments for health
care as part of a wide-ranging household survey. Indeed, household
surveys generally reveal lower informal payment prevalence rates
than small, dedicated surveys, where interviewees are asked multiple
detailed questions about payments and their responses are probed
(Balabanova and McKee, 2002; Lewis, 2007).
Measurement challenges also reflect deeper conceptual and def-
initional challenges. Informal payments may or may not be illegal.
Even if they are illegal, they could be widespread and considered to
be legitimate (Gaal et al., 2006a). In the same facilities, there can be
many types of informal payments. They can vary in terms of who is
making the payment, to whom, how much they are giving, when the
payment is made, where it is made, and for what reason (Sharma
et al., 2005; Gaal et al., 2006a). Payments may be made to the treat-
ing doctor, nurse or other medical professional; an administrator;
pharmacist; janitorial or other facilities employee; or someone else.
Many patients (and their families) make multiple payments to mul-
tiple people during an extended interaction with the system (Sharma
et al., 2005; Jeffery and Jeffery, 2010; Mæstad and Mwisongo,
2011). They may consider some of these to be gifts and others to be
coerced. Patient and provider interpretations of payments vary enor-
mously as well; patients and providers may reportedly have different
interpretations of the same interaction as well as of the phenomenon
as a whole. Moreover, practices and interpretations are embedded
in the larger health system; ‘each transaction is thus understood, not
as a one off market event, but rather as shaped by information,
expectations, levels of trust, norms of behavior and incentives, all of
which evolve over time through market and other social interaction’
(Tibandebage and Mackintosh, 2005).
Of those studies that differentiate among different types of serv-
ices, most find that informal payments may be particularly prevalent
in the obstetric care setting. First, studies have concluded that pay-
ments are more likely to be made—and are higher—for inpatient
care and/or for specialist care, either or both of which are usually
entailed in delivery care (Killingsworth et al., 1999; McPake et al.,
1999; Miller et al., 2000; Riewpaiboon et al., 2005; Lewis, 2007;
Vian, 2008; Aarva et al., 2009; Perkins et al., 2009; Baji et al.,
2012; Mokhtari and Ashtari, 2012; Joe, 2015; Vian et al., 2015).
Though few studies examine payments in such granular detail, it
appears that even as compared with other reasons for inpatient care,
obstetric care may be more likely to incur informal payment
(McPake et al., 1999; Falkingham, 2004; Riewpaiboon et al., 2005;
Aarva et al., 2009; Mokhtari and Ashtari, 2012; Stepurko et al.,
2013). For example, a study on payments for healthcare in Hungary
found that those receiving inpatient care were more likely to make
an informal payment than those receiving outpatient care, and, of
those receiving inpatient care, patients receiving labour and delivery
care were even more likely than those receiving other services (Baji
et al., 2012). The dynamics of obstetric care delivery, in particular,
may contribute to higher rates of informal payments. Women are
often urgently in need of care and they and their families have insuf-
ficient time to negotiate, leaving them with little leverage. They are
also concerned with the health of both the mother and the newborn
(rather than just one person as in most interactions with the health
system); some women are even asked to pay after delivery in order
to see the newborn, often more for a boy (Sharma et al., 2005;
McPake et al., 1999; Holmberg and Rothstein, 2011). Moreover, in
some settings, obstetric care entails a long-term (6 to 10 months) re-
lationship with the same obstetrician. Studies from Thailand and
Ukraine found that women were willing to pay to achieve interper-
sonal trust and care, as they intend to rely on the same provider
through the pregnancy and delivery; women paid to facilitate the
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relationship, and to ensure that the doctor they paid would indeed
deliver their baby (Riewpaiboon et al., 2005; Stepurko et al., 2013).
With the exception of the Thailand and the Ukraine examples, over-
all, the studies indicated that providers may have used the antenatal
period to lay the groundwork for demanding significant informal
payments at the time of delivery, but we did not see evidence that
antenatal visits (as opposed to delivery care) themselves were more
or less likely than other visits to entail an informal payment.
Drivers
Studies and conceptual articles identified both proximate drivers of
informal payments, as well as distal systemic causes. The drivers
below are common to many studies, though some are more common
in specific types of studies. For example, human resource scarcity is
most often examined in economic analyses. Bringing together these
analyses from different traditions helps us to arrive at a richer and
more profound understanding of informal payments, as well as of
how they are understood (Gilson et al., 2011). We start with prox-
imal causes and move on to systemic causes.
Norms of gift giving and reciprocity
Patients and providers sometimes assert that gifts or payments are
consistent with cultural norms of gift giving and reciprocity, particu-
larly in the context of the government health system, where patients
are usually receiving care from someone of a higher social status
(Gaal and McKee, 2004; Chiu et al., 2007; Mokhtari and Ashtari,
2012; Vian et al., 2012; Nekoeimoghadam et al., 2013; Cohen and
Filc, 2017). However, ascertaining to what extent norms of gift giv-
ing play a role is challenging. Some patients may consider that they
are giving a gift or a tip, while another patient may consider a very
similar transaction not to be tipping. These differences in interpret-
ation can be seen in large-scale surveys. For example, in response to
a survey question in the 2008 round of the Vietnam Household
Living Standards Survey about whether a government official receiv-
ing a ‘small gift or money after performing duties’ was corruption,
45% said yes, 37% said no and 18% were undecided (World Bank,
2010b). Researcher interpretations are layered on top of patient
interpretations. We found a variety of researcher interpretations of
the extent to which gratitude played a role; these differences may be
due to real differences in the countries being studied, the researcher’s
primary research questions and area of interest, and, the researcher’s
personal feelings regarding payment for health care. Some research-
ers argue that ‘the concept of “gratitude payment” is no more than a
convenient myth that has been used to make an unacceptable phe-
nomenon acceptable’ (Gaal, 2006), an outlook, i.e. echoed in vary-
ing degrees in the broader health systems literature (Dasgupta et al.,
2015) and in the human rights literature (Feinglass et al., 2016). At
the same time, there are others who insist that norms of gift giving—
such as in China—‘cannot be reduced to a modern western notion
of corruption because the personalistic qualities of obligation, in-
debtedness, and reciprocity are just as important as transactions in
material benefit’ (Yang, 1994, p. 108). There is variation in the ex-
tent to which researchers find support for the gift giving hypothesis,
though it is fair to say that the notion of gift giving and tipping is
evoked in nearly every global health article about informal pay-
ments. We did not find any articles or researchers who dismiss the
entire phenomenon in a LMIC as patient-driven gift giving or tip-
ping, and only one—from Iran—that concluded that expressing ap-
preciation was the most important motive for making informal
payments (Aboutorabi et al., 2016). Thus, among the research and
analysis focused on LMICs, there is widespread agreement that,
while there may be a cultural element, the economy of informal pay-
ments cannot be reduced to gift giving; there are other drivers at
play.
Scarcity of providers
Scarcity of providers is often noted, though it is not extensively
explored, as a cause of informal fee charges. Among other factors,
scarcity is putatively caused by low salaries, maldistribution and in-
adequate opportunities for medical education and training (Chen
et al., 2004; Rowe et al., 2005; Willis-Shattuck et al., 2008; Frenk
et al., 2010). The assumption is that there are too many patients for
the number of health providers, so the ‘market price’ of seeing a
health care provider is increased; providers hold a monopoly on ser-
vice provision (Gaal and McKee, 2004; Vian et al., 2012; Kaitelidou
et al., 2013; Abdallah et al., 2015; Cohen and Filc, 2017). Informal
payments thus fill a gate-keeping function by deterring some
patients from seeking care at all, and/or by creating multiple tiers of
wait time and quality according to ability to pay (Mæstad and
Mwisongo, 2011; Abdallah et al., 2015). Some (though not all) pa-
tient survey evidence suggests that health providers of a higher pro-
fessional status receive higher informal payments, buttressing a
theory about there being a supply and demand-driven market clear-
ing price (Bertone and Lagarde, 2016). On the other hand, it is also
possible that providers purposely create scarcity—such as by artifi-
cially inflating wait times—in order to compel patients to make pay-
ments (Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011).
Formal user fees
In global health policy circles, prevailing opinion has mostly turned
against formal user fees as an appropriate way to fund health serv-
ices (Robert and Ridde, 2013). Yet, some researchers and policy-
makers have proposed formal user fees as a way of decreasing
informal payments, suggesting that there is a direct relationship be-
tween the two, with informal payments decreasing as formal fees in-
crease, and vice-versa (Sharma et al., 2005). The prevailing
hypothesis is that, if instituted well, formal payments introduce
transparency and provide needed funding for the health facility.
Formal fees may also exhaust patients’ willingness to pay, making it
infeasible for providers to demand informal payments (James et al.,
2006). However, empirical data from different countries are mixed.
On the other hand, if formal fees are not channelled appropriately,
informal payments may be introduced as a remedial measure to pro-
duce needed funding. A modelling study undertaken in Bangladesh
reported that it was ‘difficult to determine whether official user fees
crowd in or out unofficial fees at Bangladesh health facilities’, as in-
formal payments and formal fees seemed to accompany one another
(Killingsworth et al., 1999). We propose that, since patients are
often unable to distinguish between formal and informal fees, it
seems likely that in some contexts, particularly those with poor gov-
ernance, formal fees actually create space for the charging of infor-
mal payments. If patients knew for sure that all care was mandated
to be free, they may be less willing to make payments.
Consistent with this varying relationship between formal and in-
formal fees, data are mixed on whether or how the institutionaliza-
tion or abolition of formal user fees affects the likelihood of patients
making informal payments. A policy review found that efforts to re-
place informal payments with formal payments and allowing health
facilities to keep the revenues led to improved quality of care and
reduced informal payments in Cambodia and the Kyrgyz Republic,
suggesting that the fees were indeed being used as intended (Akashi
et al., 2004; Lewis, 2007). However, a scoping study assessing 20
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studies on the abolition of formal user fees found several examples
of the commencement or the continuation of informal payments fol-
lowing the abolition of formal user fees (Ridde and Morestin,
2011). Moreover, our ability to draw conclusions is limited by the
fact that there are few longitudinal studies showing how the institu-
tionalization of formal user fees shapes informal payment preva-
lence in the long run (Witter et al., 2007). At the very least, there is
widespread agreement that enshrining formal payments in policy is
only a piece of the puzzle; transparent guidance, mechanisms to en-
sure appropriate use and a host of other governance factors shape
the health systems impact of formal payments (James et al., 2006;
Lewis, 2007). In fact, broader health system governance may be the
most determinative factor. One study found that, when accompa-
nied by adequate drug supply and financial transfers to the facility,
the exemption of certain services from user fees in Ghana led to the
disappearance of informal payments for these services. This suggests
that ending formal fees can lead to decreases in informal fee pay-
ments in a context of strong health system governance (Aberese-Ako
et al., 2014).
Inadequate health system financing
Other research looks at salaries and funding of the health system
more broadly. In many contexts, funding is inadequate for the goods
and services which consequently become the subject of informal
payments. This can stem from absolute resource deprivation in the
health system, as well as governance and human resource con-
straints undercutting timely and appropriate funds and supplies
transfer from the central level to lower levels of the system. As a re-
sult, health providers claim that health facilities are not adequately
resourced to provide the services they are mandated to provide, so
patients must contribute (Falkingham, 2004; Gaal et al., 2006a;
Chuma et al., 2009; Stringhini et al., 2009; Nimpagaritse and
Bertone, 2011; Stepurko et al., 2013).
Findings regarding the relationship between provider salaries
and informal payments are not consistent. Focus groups conducted
among providers in Tanzania found that doctors and specialists
commanded higher informal payments than nurses and assistants
(Stringhini et al., 2009), a finding that was confirmed in another
study in Tanzania (Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011). A regression
analysis of data reported by providers and patients regarding infor-
mal payments in Tanzania found that providers earning relatively
lower salaries were somewhat more likely to receive informal pay-
ments than those receiving higher salaries (with the likelihood of
receiving payments being a separate question from the amount of
the payment) (Lindkvist, 2014). In keeping with these findings,
in-depth interviews among lay people and providers in Togo
revealed much higher willingness to excuse demands for informal
payments when made by providers with low salaries (Kpanake
et al., 2014). Here too, there could be measurement challenges, as
providers redistribute payments among themselves (Mæstad and
Mwisongo, 2011). Indeed, there may be a divergence between the
amount different types of providers’ request, and the amount they
ultimately receive. Additionally, as suggested by some researchers, a
theory about salary relevance might be advanced by acknowledging
that the notion of ‘adequate salary’ and minimum standard of living
are economically and socially governed, such that the relationship
between provider salary and informal payments is contextually spe-
cific, and thus not comparable or meaningful across contexts
(Transparency International, 2006; Stringhini et al., 2009).
In some contexts, informal user fees may comprise a significant
portion of the operational funding for health facilities (Barber et al.,
2004). Such fees are collected and spent at the discretion of facility
management, rather than going entirely to individual providers.
Facility management uses the money to fund goods and services that
go directly to the patient as well as necessary supportive inputs, such
as petrol (Falkingham, 2004; Diarra, 2012). Informal user fees
might be considered to be a manifestation of what anthropologist
Olivier de Sardan (2011) describes as ‘informal privatization’. They
may be one of few means at frontline providers’ disposal to ‘make
the system work’, and they may help to keep providers from leaving
a poorly resourced health system to seek employment elsewhere
(Gaal et al., 2006a; Olivier de Sardan, 2011; Diarra, 2012). Yet,
these payments can also very easily ‘become a racket, benefiting
only the providers to the detriment of the users’ (Olivier de Sardan,
2011). The boundary between necessity and racket is hard to
delineate.
Structural adjustment, new public management and marketization
Structural adjustment programmes, the selective primary health care
movement, the 1987 Bamako Initiative and its emphasis on cost re-
covery in health care, the institutionalization of so-called ‘New
Public Management,’ and the associated focus on efficiency were
part of a broader trend of decreasing the size of the public sector in
the 1980s and 1990s (Tendler and Freedheim, 1994; Pfeiffer and
Nichter, 2008; Janes and Corbett, 2009; Storeng and Be´hague,
2014). The institutionalization of formal user fees and decreased
state investment in the health sector were part of this trend. Health
systems researchers explain that these and other changes often
undercut citizen and provider trust in the system and in each other,
laying the groundwork for more transactional relationships
(Birungi, 1998; Gilson, 2003; Janes and Chuluundorj, 2004; Gaal
et al., 2006a; Jeffery and Jeffery, 2010; Songstad et al., 2011;
Spangler, 2011; Mokhtari and Ashtari, 2012; Sadruddin and
Heung, 2015). For example, Birungi (1998) describes how, in
Uganda, government disinvestment in health service inputs and in
the health workforce pushed government health workers to adopt
‘survival strategies’, including initiating their own private sector
activities and levying informal payments on patients. So, while abso-
lute resource deprivation may be one cause, the concomitant trans-
formation of the doctor–patient and government–citizen
relationship to a provider–customer relationship may also be ger-
mane to understanding informal payments (Riewpaiboon et al.,
2005; Spangler, 2011; Mokhtari and Ashtari, 2012).
Likely overlapping with the marketization dynamic, where
studied, provider morale seems to relate to the likelihood that they
ask patients to make payments. Studies of health providers in Ghana
and Tanzania found that the providers who felt more abused by
their supervisors and by the system and/or who lacked the basic
inputs required to carry out their jobs were more likely to abuse
patients, including pushing them to make informal payments
(Tibandebage and Mackintosh, 2005; Aberese-Ako et al., 2014).
Providers in Ghana explained that they were being asked to provide
people-centred care while the health system employing them did not
value them as professionals or people; there was a disconnect be-
tween their employment context and the performance expected of
them (Aberese-Ako et al., 2014).
Paying for better care
By their own admission, many patients make informal payments in
the public sector in the hopes that they will receive better care. They
may be paying to ensure a continuous, interpersonal relationship
with the provider; for more personalized care; for higher quality
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clinical care; for shorter wait times; and for more comfortable care
(Vaithianathan, 2003; Gaal and McKee, 2004; Mamdani and
Bangser, 2004; Riewpaiboon et al., 2005; Sepehri et al., 2005;
Aarva et al., 2009; Stringhini et al., 2009; Vian et al., 2012;
Lindkvist, 2013; Nekoeimoghadam et al., 2013; Stepurko et al.,
2013; Karibayev et al., 2016; Baji et al., 2017; Najar et al., 2017).
For example, Riewpaiboon et al. (2005) describe how Thai women
select and pay an obstetrician to see them through their pregnancy
and delivery, in the hopes that the money will transform an imper-
sonal doctor–patient relationship to a trustful interpersonal relation-
ship. The imbalance of power between patients and providers may
be relevant too. Research in the USA and Hungary suggests that gifts
from patients to doctors may be a way for patients to redress the sta-
tus imbalance between them and their doctors by redeeming their
status lost by being ill and dependent, or by imposing a non-
professional identity on the physician (Drew et al., 1983; Gaal et al.,
2006a).
To unpack the exercise of patient agency in the structure of gov-
ernmental health systems, Gaal and McKee (2004) take economist
Albert Hirschman’s theory of ‘voice and exit’ and devised the con-
cept of ‘inxit’ to describe informal payments. In many contexts,
patients lack an ‘exit’ option, as there are no alternative facilities
(government or non-government) nearby. They may also have inad-
equate knowledge and opportunity to express ‘voice’ (e.g. dissatis-
faction or demands), and they can be dissuaded from voicing their
opinions by the significant social risk inherent in alienating the
health providers on whom they depend. ‘Inxit’—or exercising choice
within the same service by making informal payments—might be
one of few means at patient disposal to influence the quality of
health services, though, unlike voice, the positive results accrue only
to the individual making the payment. In fact, patients making pay-
ments could result in poorer quality of care for those who do not
make payments (Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011).
But, even if patients willingly pay to obtain better care, what
other options do they have? Similar to the blurry boundary between
necessary financial support and a ‘racket’, the boundary between pa-
tient agency and obligation or coercion is nebulous and likely con-
textual. While patients with at least a minimal amount of disposable
income may wish to make informal payments to reduce the oppor-
tunity cost of obtaining care (by cutting down on the time entailed)
or to express their status and right to receive higher quality care,
they may also feel that they have little choice, particularly in the ob-
stetric context (Sepehri et al., 2005). If the expected quality of ma-
ternal and newborn care absent a payment is poor, or if they feel
payment is required to receive any care at all, then from the patient
perspective, informal payment is non-negotiable (Gaal et al., 2006a;
Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011).
Several other potential drivers and associated factors are raised
in the literature, but they are mentioned rarely, making synthesis dif-
ficult. These include the relative size of the private sector, the
strength and detail of law and policy relating to informal payments,
norms around physicians asserting their own professional status by
demanding fees, the entitlements knowledge of the patient making
the payment, patient characteristics beyond income level (such as
caste) and larger questions about modes of health systems financing
(Stringhini et al., 2009; Mokhtari and Ashtari, 2012;
Nekoeimoghadam et al., 2013; Arnold et al., 2014; Renfrew et al.,
2014; Abdallah et al., 2015).
Finally, some of the drivers can also be impacts, and vice-versa.
Low levels of interpersonal and institutional trust, e.g. can both
drive informal payments and result from them (Gilson, 2003;
Stringhini et al., 2009; Najar et al., 2017).
Impact
Informal payments can have multiple immediate and distal effects
on households, communities and the health system. First, informal
payments can form a significant part of a catastrophic out-of-pocket
expenditure associated with an illness event, particularly in the event
of labour and delivery complications (Tibandebage and
Mackintosh, 2005; Jeffery and Jeffery, 2010; Perkins et al., 2009).
Families may be forced to borrow money at high rates, solicit contri-
butions from friends and family or sell productive assets (Kruk
et al., 2008; Joe, 2015). The poorest are more likely to fall into this
‘poverty trap’ of debt and selling productive assets (Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health, 2001; Kruk et al., 2008; Tambor
et al., 2014; Joe, 2015). Moreover, as a generally flat fee levied on
families regardless of their ability to pay, informal payments can be
regressive, though whether or not the poorest are more or less likely
to pay seems to vary among and even within countries
(Killingsworth et al., 1999; Riewpaiboon et al., 2005; Kruk et al.,
2008; Aarva et al., 2009; Hunt, 2010; Nekoeimoghadam et al.,
2013). Two recent analyses of secondary data from many countries
in sub-Saharan Africa determined that informal payments were gen-
erally concentrated among the poorest, undercutting the theory that
scarcity and absolute resource deprivation in the health system are
the primary drivers, and suggesting that the social status of certain
patients may prevent providers from asking them to make payments
(Justesen and Bjørnskov, 2014; Kankeu and Ventelou, 2016).
When patients anticipate having to pay, or have paid in the past,
it can also erode trust and satisfaction with the health system.
Outcomes include women bypassing facilities known to demand in-
formal payments or avoiding facility-based delivery altogether
(Birungi, 1998; McPake et al., 1999; Gilson, 2003; Mamdani and
Bangser, 2004; Uslaner, 2004; Tibandebage and Mackintosh, 2005;
Mrisho et al., 2007; Otis and Brett, 2008; Kruk et al., 2009; Hunt,
2010; Izugbara and Ngilangwa, 2010; Jeffery and Jeffery, 2010;
Janevic et al., 2011; Mokhtari and Ashtari, 2012; Vian et al., 2012;
Brody et al., 2013; Coffey, 2014; McMahon et al., 2014). The rela-
tionship between satisfaction and payments can be dynamic, with
poor satisfaction both driving and resulting from informal payments
(Tibandebage and Mackintosh, 2005).
It appears that many women experience requests for payments
for maternity care as extremely coercive and disrespectful (Bowser
and Hill, 2010; Jeffery and Jeffery, 2010; Bohren et al., 2014; 2015;
Coffey, 2014; Freedman and Kruk, 2014). Egregious examples of
coercion and disrespect include threatening statements such as
women being told they will die if they do not pay, being asked re-
peatedly by different people working in the facility to make pay-
ments or risk negligence or worse, being denied pain relief during
suturing unless a payment is made immediately, women being told
they cannot see their newborn until they pay, and providers arguing
with the family about a payment while the woman is in active labour
(Afsana, 2004; Sharma et al., 2005; Ith et al., 2013; Coffey, 2014).
In these cases, providers exploit women’s vulnerability and sense of
urgency, leaving patients and families with little room to negotiate.
Moreover, they can impinge significantly on a childbirth event,
changing the dynamics to be about power and poverty, rather than
welcoming a new baby. Those who are ultimately unable to pay (or
suspected of such) may face ongoing disrespectful treatment, poorer
quality of clinical care or outright denial of care (Izugbara and
Ngilangwa, 2010; Coffey, 2014; McMahon et al., 2014).
Informal fees can also negatively affect provider morale and be-
haviour. Providers report that they feel forced into asking for pay-
ments as they otherwise would not have adequate salary or
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materials. Doing so, however, can make them feel like they are fail-
ing to fulfil their professional mandate; fearful of being caught; or,
in some cases, that the balance of power has shifted in favour of the
patient, who has essentially become a customer (Human Rights
Watch, 2009; Nekoeimoghadam et al., 2013; Cohen and Filc, 2017;
Najar et al., 2017). Moreover, the desire or the imperative to receive
informal fees can drive providers and facilities to consider factors
other than patient and population health in making clinical deci-
sions. This may include pushing unnecessary clinical services that
garner a higher payment, providers competing for patients who are
perceived to be more lucrative; and health workers deliberately pro-
viding poor quality of care or exerting less effort until a patient
pays, or, until another health worker who has already accepted an
informal payment from this patient shares that payment (Gaal et al.,
2006a; Vian, 2008; Stringhini et al., 2009; Mæstad and Mwisongo,
2011; Lindkvist, 2013; Cohen and Filc, 2017).
Lenses applied
The evidence and policy synthesized above were influenced by dif-
ferent conceptual approaches to informal payments and to health
systems governance. We do not describe below well-known
strengths and weaknesses of each approach, such as the cost of re-
search, required time investment and ability to generate ‘thick
descriptions’ or population-wide data. Rather, we summarize the
analyses within each conceptual approach below and offer counter-
points to each. As we read the articles we noticed a few prevailing
conceptual approaches, namely corruption, econometrics and quali-
tative research. We were able to class all of the empirical articles we
read into these broad categories. That being said, a minority of
articles have elements of more than one approach. The summaries
of each approach below describe various strands and tensions within
each conceptual approach, illustrate how different studies and pol-
icy documents may reflect particular conceptual approaches, and
help us to critically assess the potential advantages and disadvan-
tages of each approach. This lays the groundwork for subsequent
discussion on addressing informal payments.
Informal payments as a form of corruption
Currently, one of the most widely used definitions of corruption is the
‘misuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (Mackey and Liang, 2012).
Informal payment requests are frequently described as a type of corrup-
tion in the health sector (Lewis, 2007; Vian, 2008; Mackey and Liang,
2012). Researchers employing a traditional corruption lens based in clas-
sic economic theory posit that corruption stems from monopoly, discre-
tion and lack of accountability (Klitgaard, 1988; Gebel, 2012). Service
providers with a monopoly (in this case, the public sector) face little com-
petition. Facing little to no credible threat of sanction for demanding
payments (discretion), these providers make a choice to misuse their
power for private gain (Mackey and Liang, 2012). The assumption is
that the incentive structure in the health system does not prevent corrup-
tion (Bukovansky, 2006; Gebel, 2012). As explained by Lewis (2000),
‘informal payments. . .provide a means by which corrupt public servants
can ensure or maximize their income, evade taxes, and effectively “beat
the system” and consequently are a form of systemic corruption’.
However, empirical evidence from several countries suggests
that this classic corruption paradigm does not describe all instances
of informal payments, and that the blanket deployment of corrup-
tion discourse can risk undermining research and action. Genuine
gift-giving and informal payments that are considered absolutely ne-
cessary to keep the facility operating or to deliver a service, such as
when providers ask a patient to purchase drugs that are part of the
entitlement but absent at site level, can hardly be described as cor-
rupt. There is no private gain in these instances. Also important to
consider is the much larger grey area of payments that patients or
providers consider to be necessary but others judge to be unneces-
sary, including those with some gratitude component. Too, patients
may wish to make payments in order to reduce wait times and assert
their status as being above the most poor. Finally, some argue that
corruption flows partly from marketization, and that the concepts
of monopoly, discretion and accountability are insufficient to under-
stand corruption; poor morale, insufficient funding and acceptance
of health care as a transaction engender corrupt practices (Gebel,
2012).
The classic corruption label may seem inappropriate to some
providers and patients. The moral culpability and illegality it implies
may be overly harsh, particularly in a context where informal pay-
ments are pervasive and considered to be legitimate (Vian et al.,
2015). For these reasons, some researchers advocate understanding
corruption as a collective action problem; the individuals most
engaged in delivering care at the frontlines may be the least able to
effect change (Burns et al., 2013; Persson et al., 2013). Corruption
continues unabated because individuals face strong pressures to con-
tinue; patients seek to obtain better care and providers face profes-
sional pressure to demand and share payments, just as their peers
do. The opportunity cost for an individual being non-corrupt is
quite high, unless everyone else becomes non-corrupt too (Persson
et al., 2013).
However, our reading in other disciplines suggests that this col-
lective action approach cannot explain the entire ecology of infor-
mal payments. For example, it fails to consider the social norms
implicit in the interactions between patients and providers, including
gift giving, as well as all of the health system challenges. For ex-
ample, even if everyone at a particular health facility were to spon-
taneously agree to stop demanding informal payments, this does not
mean that drugs would immediately become available (Menochal
et al., 2015). Moreover, many providers and patients may prefer
that the system continue as is, so they do not think there is a collect-
ive action problem. Patients with more resources may prefer a two-
tier system of quality that benefits those who can pay, and some pro-
viders may prefer a system that benefits them directly (Vian et al.,
2012; Walton and Jones, 2017).
Walton (2015) describes an ‘institutional decay’ understanding
of corruption. We propose some researchers might consider design-
ing studies that allow such emic understandings to emerge, rather
than imposing a priori assumptions about corruption. These emic
perspectives might yield more apt policy responses. The decay hy-
pothesis is consistent with the proposition that we should focus on
the ‘system in which professionals are working, rather than the per-
sons themselves’ when it comes to understanding corruption
(Ferrinho et al., 2004). Further, it improves upon ‘thin conceptions
of institutions as incentive structures’ to look at political and norma-
tive underpinnings (Brown and Cloke, 2004; Bukovansky, 2006).
Walton (2015) developed hypothetical scenarios reflecting different
understandings of corruption and found that those matching the ‘in-
stitutional decay’ approach resonated strongly with survey respond-
ents in Papua New Guinea; they considered the notion of moral
atrophy of institutions to be especially harmful, and stated that it
aptly described their experiences with the state. Though the low
level of state penetration in Papua New Guinea is unusual, the broad
notion of institutional decay is resonant with our synthesis of the
systems drivers of informal payments.
The institutional decay understanding goes beyond a decoding of
individual motivation and incentives to assess historical, social and
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institutional norms and modes of operating. These modes can be
described in different ways. From the provider perspective, Olivier
de Sardan (2008) describes practical norms, which are contrary to
official norms, but widespread and embedded in civil servant prac-
tice. These norms are generally implicit and consistent over time
(Olivier de Sardan, 2008; Olivier de Sardan and Ridde, 2015). Such
norms may be particularly acceptable to patients who understand
(under-resourced or poorly remunerated) providers’ plight (Kpanake
et al., 2014).
Research assessing the link between trust and corruption has
found that higher levels of trust in public institutions—as opposed
to just interpersonal trust—are associated with decreased corruption
(So¨o¨t and Rootalu, 2012). This suggests that whole systems concepts
such as institutional decay are ripe for exploration; it seems that
what people think about the government or ‘the system’ relates to
their experiences of corruption. Focusing solely on regulating indi-
vidual encounters might be less effective absent efforts to reform the
institution. Such approaches are not yet widespread in the literature,
though it is increasingly visible. For example, Vian (2008), a long-
time researcher on corruption in the health sector, proposes that
Olivier de Sardan’s notion of practical norms is an important area
for future study. Similarly, an analysis of the discourse within
Transparency International (TI)—a global leader on anti-corruption
discourse—stated that TI increasingly acknowledges the relevance
of a more holistic, ethics-based approach, but that this approach is
far from entrenched in their practice (Gebel, 2012).
Ethnographic and in-depth qualitative research
Ethnographic research has shed light on the patient and provider ex-
perience of informal payments, the local institutional context, and
the wider social and political structures that influence the local insti-
tutional context. Moreover, given some of the measurement chal-
lenges described earlier, observational and in-depth interview
techniques are particularly suited to drawing out the implicit, hidden
nature of informal payments. Anthropology ‘has a long and rich
tradition for studying hidden practices and illegal or semi-legal
exchanges’ (Nuijten and Anders, 2007, p. 4).
Using surveys to understand individual motivations related to in-
formal payments may be particularly ineffective in contexts where
respondents associate lists of closed-ended questions with governmen-
tal data collection, and thus fail to provide honest responses (Sessener,
2001). In contrast, one-on-one in-depth interviews and observations
may allow researchers to ascertain what informal payments mean
from the actors’ own point of view (Sessener, 2001), and how infor-
mal payments are related to a ‘configuration of broader practices’
that illuminate the relations between patients and the health sector
and relationships within the health sector itself (Blundo and Olivier
de Sardan, 2006, p. 87). While ethnographic approaches do not com-
municate the scale of informal payments, understanding the meanings
attached to informal payments is essential to establishing if they do in
fact have an impact, i.e. on balance negative in a given context, and if
so, how they might be changed. For example, Spangler (2011)
recounts the statement of a Tanzanian woman: ‘You don’t have the
power to refuse. What will happen when your child gets malaria? Or
the next time you go to deliver. No, No. This you cannot refuse’. The
inability to refuse and fear of future contact with the health system
may not be easily discerned in a survey, yet these factors are essential
to understanding the larger impact on trust and citizenship informal
payments can have. Similarly, learning through a health system-based
ethnography that informal payments are shared among several pro-
viders or that informal payments lower provider morale may be key
to ascertaining how informal payments may be disrupted (Pfeiffer and
Nichter, 2008; Aberese-Ako et al., 2014; Hoag and Hull, 2017). The
fact that providers may feel their professional role is compromised by
these payments is an important ‘hook’ for efforts to reduce informal
payments.
Micro-economic
Economists have used a willingness-to-pay framework or economet-
ric modelling to understand some of the immediate causes and
impacts of informal payments. The concept of scarcity and much of
the theory and data on the relationship of formal user fees and pro-
vider salaries to informal payments come from this tradition (Baji
et al., 2012).
To unearth the prevalence, drivers and impact of fees, research-
ers have conducted original surveys, analysed large household sur-
vey data sets and proposed econometric models of factors associated
with informal payments. Though this approach can make a focus on
systems and complexity difficult, and are limited by measurement
challenges, these studies provide the most complete data on the fre-
quency and geographic scope of informal payments, including on
the higher rates of payment by obstetric patients (Mokhtari and
Ashtari, 2012). Moreover, they have played a key role in elucidating
economic impacts at the household and facility levels, such as when
and where informal payments are regressive, how informal pay-
ments and other out-of-pocket payments can have a catastrophic ef-
fect on household economic stability, and how the existence of
payments creates a two-tiered (or even a multi-tiered) system of
quality (Killingsworth et al., 1999; Hunt, 2010; Abdallah et al.,
2015; Joe, 2015).
Synthesizing data from these and other paradigms illustrates the
value of an inter-disciplinary approach. Each lens has particular
added value and weaknesses. These attributes in turn affect the solu-
tions proposed.
What to do?
Proposed ways of reducing the harm of informal payments have run
the gamut from general civil service reform to narrow efforts to
change the ‘incentives’ providers and patients face to health system
improvements, such as reducing stock outs. A discussion of all of
these proposed interventions is beyond the scope of this article, but
a brief summary elucidates how theoretical orientation, policy prag-
matism and expediency shape some of the solutions proposed.
Global health experts and economists often suggest addressing
the putative proximate determinants of provider incentives, such as
raising their salaries, allowing private sector moonlighting, institut-
ing formal fees and stronger sanctions for demands for informal
payments, and stating provision of bonuses based on the number of
patients served (Gaal and McKee, 2004; Lewis, 2007). There are
multiple examples of these policies being implemented in isolation,
or without attention to professional norms and larger issues such as
trust (Chereches¸ et al., 2011; Leˆ, 2013; Stepurko et al., 2013). There
are also examples of reforms being implemented partially, such that
achieving the intended impact is unlikely (Witter et al., 2007;
Aberese-Ako et al. 2014). Even if new policies are implemented with
full fidelity, they may be unable to change the broader dynamics,
such that informal payments persist (Lewis, 2007). Some suggest
‘working with the grain’ by acknowledging practical norms and
attempting to shift them; a group of anthropologists working in
West Africa described a successful effort led by a ‘reformer midwife’
to cut the average daily health care worker income from informal
fees in half (Olivier de Sardan et al., 2017).
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Many researchers and advocates explore citizen ability to contest
informal payments. They recommend individual and collective ex-
pression of voice, or dedicated monitoring efforts as a means to
claim rights. The implicit assumption is that increased citizen and
policymaker knowledge, collective action and opportunities to dia-
logue with local providers and officials will lead to greater account-
ability regarding informal payments (George et al., 2005; Vian,
2008; Vian et al., 2012; Schatz, 2013; Pieterse and Lodge, 2015;
Molina et al., 2016). There are some examples of local level health
facility responsiveness, including regarding informal payments,
stemming from community monitoring and other social accountabil-
ity efforts (Dasgupta et al., 2015; Molina et al., 2016).
However, there are several caveats in the empirical literature.
First, individuals and communities need to be aware of their rights
in order to claim them (Mamdani and Bangser, 2004; Chuma et al.,
2009; Dasgupta, 2011; Spangler, 2011; Mokhtari and Ashtari,
2012). They also need to feel safe claiming them; as described, the
poor, particularly women, may be reluctant to alienate providers at
the only health facility in their area, particularly because they and
their families will rely on them in the future (Spangler, 2011; George
and Branchini, 2017).
Second, to address some of the institutional decay at issue, front-
line monitoring efforts might need to move beyond the most sensa-
tional examples of health provider abuse to challenge the underlying
system wide failures (George et al., 2005). This is harder to do with
scattered efforts at community monitoring. An integrated, scaled up
accountability effort that addresses multiple levels and agencies of
the government, communities and institutional capacity may be
needed (Fox, 2015; Halloran, 2015). Building alliances between
providers and community members on shared priorities—such as
lack of adequate drugs and supplies—hold potential as part of a
larger strategic approach (Fox, 2015).
Others have proposed ways of addressing broader factors
that can both be drivers and impacts of informal payments, such as
levels of institutional and interpersonal trust. This might be
accomplished through enhanced quality accreditation; changing
the cost and reimbursement structure in hospitals; greater engage-
ment of professional associations and training bodies; and greater
attention to health system governance (Riewpaiboon et al., 2005;
Piroozi et al., 2017).
Conclusion
CIS entails moving beyond aggregation and breaking new ground
in synthesis. We have accomplished this by interrogating a hetero-
geneous literature, in a way that has not yet been done in discus-
sions of informal payments. The synthesis of lenses that have been
used to study informal payments further shows how these para-
digms inform empirical work on fee prevalence, and we suggest
ways in which approaches from outside the traditional global
health literature can productively be applied to unpacking and
addressing informal payments.
Informal payments are a manifestation of health system dysfunc-
tion. Their most negative effects are on those who are the most dis-
empowered in under-resourced and poorly governed health
systems—frontline providers and their patients. Recent conceptual
work asserts that disrespect and abuse in maternity care should be
defined by both patients’ subjective experiences and provider intent
(Freedman et al., 2014). This approach can be applied to informal
payments. As learning from several disciplines shows, the harm in
informal payments is located in subjective patient experience of
coercion, disrespect, fear or economic damage as well as provider in-
tent to take advantage of patients and provider sentiments that the
health system does not give them the resources required to realize
their professional mandate.
Payments may allow some patients with adequate capital to by-
pass the most egregious manifestations of health system dysfunction,
but they do nothing to mitigate that dysfunction. In fact, informal
payments may feed dysfunction by perpetrating clientelism and cor-
ruption in the allocation of postings to health care workers (Schaaf
and Freedman, 2015). Thus, harm goes beyond the individual.
Informal payments can undercut trust beyond those people implicated
in any given encounter, and contribute to health services being pro-
vided and received as a commodity, rather than an entitlement. This
has implications for community willingness and capacity to access
services, the quality of communication between patients and providers
within the service, and community trust in the government.
Our chosen definition of informal payments includes all pay-
ments that are beyond entitlement; some of these payments may nei-
ther hurt patients nor stem from provider avarice. While this
definition is conceptually clear-cut, it is empirically difficult to as-
sess, challenging research and policy related to informal payments.
There are advantages and disadvantages to the various approaches
in which any definition is embedded. Like many health systems
issues, it appears that different lenses each tell only part of the story.
The appropriateness of an approach depends partly on contextual
factors and the questions we seek to answer. For example, analysis
of provider incentives might be more apt in settings where corrup-
tion is not endemic. The ultimate objective of any research should
be to tell as much of the story about the practice and its meanings as
possible, without getting lost in a hall of postmodern mirrors that
offers few possible solutions.
The everyday relevance of informal payments to both maternity
care providers and patients globally is not reflected in the research
base, which privileges EE, fSU and analysis of proximate and indi-
vidualistic determinants. Microeconomic analyses of these proxim-
ate determinants may lead to overly narrow solutions, but even
here, we have little long-term data or fully implemented pro-
grammes on which to judge the efficacy of solutions. In any case, the
demonstrable importance of trust, provider morale, institutional
determinants of corruption and the social construction of rights
revealed in qualitative analyses suggest that a multidisciplinary
health systems approach that leverages and integrates positivist,
interpretivist and constructivist lenses of social science research can
lead to better insight and policy critiques. Among other questions,
the boundary between informal payments as palliative mechanism
and exploitation, the power and equity determinants and outcomes of
payments, and the interplay between local and global (translocal) con-
structions of corruption and informal payments merit exploration.
With this, we can challenge inadequate ‘master narratives’ and strive
to meet universalistic, equity-oriented global health objectives.
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